MD5 Chosen-Prefix Collisions on GPUs

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Black Hat USA 2009 - July 30, 2009

Agenda

- MD5 on GPUs
- Dec 2008: rogue CA certificate on PS3 cluster
- MD5 birthday search
- Results & performance

MD5 on GPUs

- MD5 is optimized for 32-bit architectures
- 32-bit integer & logical instructions
- GPGPU tech makes it possible to run arbitrary code
- GPUs are <u>massively parallel</u> chips with lots of ALUs

MD5 on GPUs (cont'd)

- Let me repeat: "massively parallel"
- As in hundreds of instructions per clock
- Why isn't everybody doing GPGPU?! Lack of awareness

Why ATI GPUs

- ATI R700 GPU family (Radeon HD 4000 series):
 - Up to 800 Stream Processing Units per ASIC
 - Clocked up to 850 Mhz
 - Dual-GPU video cards
- Best perf/W and perf/\$ (July 2009): HD 4850 X2
 - 2nd fastest video card in the world
 - <u>1 trillion</u> 32-bit instructions/sec (2 TFLOPS)
 - TDP 230W, Price US\$220
- Can't wait to see next-gen R800

Why not Nvidia

- Top-of-the-line member of the Nvidia GT200 GPU family: GTX 295
 - 596 billion 32-bit instructions/sec
 - TDP 290W, Price US\$500
- Raw perf/W and perf/\$ respectively roughly 2 times and 4 times worse than HD 4850 X2
- However Nvidia CUDA SDK is more mature
- Next-gen GT300 will be better ?

Rogue CA

- When: Dec 2008, paper published in Mar 2009
- Where: 25th Chaos Communication Congress (25C3)
- Who: 7 researchers (Sotirov, Stevens, Applebaum, Lenstra, Molnar, Osvik, Weger)
- What: implemented an MD5 chosen-prefix collision attack on a cluster of 215 PlayStation 3s to create a rogue CA

Rogue CA (cont'd)

- Simplified explanation:
 - Create cert "A" and rogue CA cert "B" with same MD5 hash
 - Get a CA to sign a cert signing request that end up producing cert A
 - Steal A's signature and apply it to B
- How to generate A and B with same MD5 hash:
 - "Birthdaying" stage ← most computing intensive part
 - "Near collision" stage

MD5 "Birthdaying"

- We have 2 "chosen-prefix" bitstrings (certs)
- When processed through MD5, lead to 2 different MD5 states (8 32-bit variables):
 - A, B, C, D
 - A', B', C', D'
- Goal of birthdaying is to append a small number of bits to find a state such as the 8 variables satisfy some conditions (see Mar 2009 paper)

MD5 "Birthdaying" (cont'd)

- Technique to find these conditions: deterministic pseudo-random walk in search space using Pollard-Rho method
- Same concept as a rainbow table chain "walking" through the search space except we are <u>looking</u> for collisions!
- Basically this search consists of running the MD5 compression function over and over

MD5 CAL IL Implementation

- Therefore to optimize the attack, a fast MD5 implementation had to be developed
- Hand-coded one in CAL IL (Compute Abstract Layer Intermediary Language) – a pseudo-assembly language for ATI GPUs

MD5 in CAL IL

```
mov r9, l101,zzzz
mov r10, l101.wwww
mov r4.x, 1100.x
whileloop
  break_logicalz r4.x
  mov r0, r7
  mov r1, r8
  mov r2, r9
  mov r3, r10
  ixor r5, r0, r1
  and r5, r5, r3
  ixor r5, r5, r1
  iadd r6, cb0[0].zzzz, cb1[0].zzzz
  iadd r5, r2, r5
  iadd r5, r5, r6
  ushr r6, r5, l1.xxxx
  umad r5, r5, l1.yyyy, r6
  iadd r2, r3, r5
  ixor r5, r3, r0
  and r5, r5, r2
```

• "CAL IL":

looks as

bad as it

sounds:)


Performance

- 1634 Mhash/sec on HD 4850 X2 (1.6 billion MD5 compression function calls per second) IOW MD5 processes 105 GByte/s
- Possible future optimization: due to a particularity of the birthday search, the first 14 out of 64 steps of the compression function can be pre-computed – should allow 2090 Mhash/sec

Theoretical GPGPU cracking server


- 2 Radeon HD 4850 X2 in a single machine
- 4 GPUs total
- About US\$750
- Power draw: 500 W from the wall
- Total of 3268 Mhash/s

Here it is



HW Implementation Details

- Flexible cut-out PCI-Express extenders to down-plug x16 cards on cheap motherboards with x1 slots
- Undocumented secret: short pins A1 & B17 to work around down-plugging compatibility issues
- Soon possible(?):
 QEMU/KVM PCI pass through feature to work
 around ATI's fglrx.ko
 driver limitation of
 4 GPUs



Comparison with PS3 cluster

■ 215 PS3s:

- 28 kW (130 W each)
- US\$86k (US\$400 each)
- 37600 Mhash/s (175 Mhash/s each)
- 12 GPGPU servers:
 - 6 kW (500 W each) 5 times less power
 - US\$9k (US\$750 each) <u>10 times cheaper</u>
 - 39200 Mhash/s (3268 Mhash/s each) and a bit faster

MD5 hash bruteforcing

- Kiwicon (November 2007) & Black Hat Europe (March 2008): Nick Breese presented an MD5 hash bruteforcer for the PlayStation 3 Cell B.E. Processor
- Claim: "1.4-1.9 billion" hash/sec... but turns out the compiler was optimizing out the code of an inner loop → real figure: 80 million hash/sec
- Bruteforcing tool built on my MD5 implementation:
 1.6 billion MD5 hash/sec on HD 4850 X2, or
 - 2.2 billion MD5 hash/sec with "MD5 reversing"

Conclusion

- Chosen-prefix collision attacks can be performed by anybody
- Public CAs have stopped signing with MD5 what about private/corporate CAs?
- If a workload can run on GPUs, do it. They are a commodity and so efficient that considering anything else does not make sense.
- Code & tools will be open-sourced at: http://perso.epita.fr/~bevand m